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Markets During the Financial Crisis
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Abstract
This paper investigates the impact of bank failures on the disciplining behavior of
depositors during the recent financial crisis. Exploiting the regional dimension of the
financial crisis in the United States and the failure of over 400 (mainly local) banks,
I document increased discipline by depositors in local banking markets despite the
existence of possible distortions such as deposit insurance schemes and bailouts. I
find that the sensitivity of depositors to bank risk is stronger in markets that have
witnessed failures, and this increase is long-lasting.
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1 Introduction
Bank regulators have emphasized the role of market discipline in Pillar 3 of the Basel
II and III accords. Contrary to monitoring by the regulator, market discipline relies on
stakeholders such as depositors to monitor and, if necessary, prevent excessive risk-taking
by banks. However, following the crisis the question is whether market discipline can still
be used as a tool in bank supervision (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2014). The events that
transpired during the crisis have given depositors mixed signals regarding the status and
safety of banks, as well as the need to monitor their riskiness.
On the one hand, increases in the deposit insurance limit and government interventions
such as bailouts have weakened incentives for depositors to monitor banks. In order
to prevent bank runs, the U.S. government temporarily increased the level of deposit
insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 in 2008, an increase made permanent in the Dodd-
Frank act. However, even uninsured depositors have been compensated recently, with
the FDIC assuming all deposits for most bank failures since the IndyMac Bank failure.1
Moreover, regulators have shown that they are also willing to intervene in the shadow
banking market with the bailout of money market funds. Given these interventions,
depositors have little incentives ex-ante to engage in active monitoring of their depository
institutions, as they are likely to be bailed out no matter how risky their banks are.
On the other hand, there have been over 400 commercial bank failures in the United
States since the beginning of the crisis. Previous studies have documented that experi-
encing events such as bank failures can lead to a wake-up call among depositors (see e.g.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Iyer and Puri, 2012). This
finding is motivated by increased risk aversion of depositors, and is consistent with an
aggregate experience hypothesis documented by, e.g., Malmendier and Nagel (2011). A
wake-up call entails renewed discipline being exerted after bank failures, as these events
can make depositors of other banks aware that their deposits are potentially also at
risk. While some recent evidence supports the notion that government interventions
have weakened overall market discipline (Cubillas et al., 2012; Berger and Turk-Ariss,
2014), it remains unclear whether depositors have woken up to the risks posed by their
banks. This paper provides evidence that, despite government interventions, depositors
exerted discipline on their banks during the crisis and that the aforementioned failures
did wake them up.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) were the first to document a wake-up of deposi-
tors, by showing that they were more responsive to banks riskiness after periods of crises
in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Interestingly, despite expansion of deposit insurance
coverage, both insured and uninsured depositors increased their monitoring. Similarly,
1Since the IndyMac Bank failed in 2008, the FDIC’s Failed Bank List and accompanying press releases
state that for most failures, the FDIC and eventual acquirer assumed all deposits.
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using data on Russian banks, Karas et al. (2010, 2013) find evidence of a wake-up call for
insured and uninsured depositors. Moreover, while the introduction of deposit insurance
weakens overall discipline, it does not completely eliminate the wake-up call. Finally,
using deposit account-level data of a bank in India, Iyer and Puri (2012) document a
bank run after the failure of an unrelated bank.
Most of the work documenting the effect of the recent crisis on market discipline
presents evidence of discipline on a subset of banks. For instance, Berger and Turk-Ariss
(2014) find that while overall discipline decreased in both the United States and Europe,
this can be chiefly attributed to decreased discipline for large and listed banks. Their
finding is consistent with moral hazard by depositors following government interventions.
For an international sample of banks, Bertay et al. (2013) find increased discipline on
systemically large banks consistent with a wake-up call. However, similar to Berger and
Turk-Ariss (2014) they document an absence of market discipline on the systemically
largest banks in the United States. It therefore seems that depositors distinguish between
risks posed by banks, and that they intentionally choose to discipline some banks while
ignoring the risks of others. Correa et al. (2012) support this notion by documenting a
bank run on U.S. branches of European banks during the European sovereign debt crisis.
Evidence on developing countries is provided by e.g., Oliveira et al. (2014) who find an
absence of discipline on Too-Big-To-Fail banks in Brazil. Moreover, using banks in CEE
countries, Hasan et al. (2013) do not find evidence of an overall wake-up call, although
there is increased discipline on affiliates of Western-European banks.
This paper investigates if the wake-up call has materialized for depositors in the United
States, and whether they discipline banks during the crisis despite a weakening of incen-
tives. In doing so, it makes two contributions to the existing literature. First, depositor
behavior is analyzed in local banking markets. Previous studies on market discipline have
used the bank entity as their fundamental unit of analysis, comparing banks on a national
or even supra-national level. However, they overlook that the relevant market for most
banks and depositors alike is the local banking market. While, increasingly, U.S. banks
have nationwide activities, these are only few in absolute numbers. Despite the trend
of deregulation and consolidation in the U.S., banks and banking markets tend to be
fragmented for well-known historical reasons. Depositors, therefore, are generally more
likely to have deposits at those banks that are active within their local market. Even
though online-banking has made it possible to deposit at out-of-market banks, it is often
seen as a complement, not a substitute, to physical bank branches (see e.g. DeYoung and
Hunter, 2002; DeYoung, 2005; DeYoung et al., 2007; Hernando and Nieto, 2007; Onay
and Ozsoz, 2013). Discipline by depositors can therefore be expected mainly on banks
active in their local market, and only relative to the other banks that are also present
there. For this reason, depositor behavior is best analyzed in local banking markets.
Second, by analyzing these local markets, this paper presents a cleaner identification
2
of a possible wake-up call during the financial crisis compared to previous studies. While
those studies rely on changes in deposits between banks before and after the crisis, this
paper exploits the fact that banks have branches in multiple markets. Even though
bank riskiness is determined and evaluated at the level of the bank, depositors can react
differently to these risks across local markets. The same bank with branches operating
in multiple markets can thus be subject to a varying degree of discipline in each market,
depending on whether a failure occurs in the market. The identification strategy employed
in this paper uses the branches of the bank in markets without failure as a control, whereas
the branches of the bank that operate in a market with a failure are used as the treatment
group. Hence, the wake-up call is measured as the difference in depositor reaction across
the markets in which the bank is active, where some have experienced a failure while
others have not. If experiencing bank failures is indeed the channel through which a
wake-up call is achieved, I expect to find an increase in discipline for those markets where
the failing banks operated a branch compared to markets without a failure.
To perform this analysis, I use publicly available information on the level of deposits
in bank branches in the U.S., obtained from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits. I show
that depositor discipline was present at the level of the local market between 2007 and
2013. Moreover, a wake-up call indeed materializes in those markets witnessing a bank
failure, and this effect does not die out after 1 year but is long-lasting. Finally, I find that
depositors react differently to bank failures of banks that are considered mainly local,
compared with failures of banks whose headquarters are located out-of-market or even
out-of-state. As such, this paper offers implications for the regulatory and supervisory
set-up following the crisis. For instance, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR) introduced
in Basel III will force banks to hold a sufficient amount of stable funding, which includes
demand and other customer deposits. This paper shows that deposit funding of banks
depends not only on the bank’s risk characteristics, but also on what is happening to
other banks in their market. Moreover, this paper also suggests that prompt action by
the FDIC to close down failing banks intended to stop bank runs can actually lead to
more involved depositors and possibly a safer banking system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodology and
data, followed by Section 3 which presents the results. Robustness tests are performed
in Section 4, after which I briefly conclude.
2 Data and methodology
2.1 Identification
Previous studies on market discipline of participants other than depositors have inves-
tigated whether publicly available risk indicators are priced into bank funding, signaling
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the perceived risk to banks. For example, they find that riskier banks have higher bond
yields/spreads (see e.g. Avery et al., 1988; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Jagtiani et al.,
1999; Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Ashcraft, 2008) and a lower market value
of equity (see e.g. Billett et al., 1998; Park and Peristiani, 2007; Baele et al., 2014). De-
positors, on the other hand, can discipline their banks in more ways than one (Flannery,
1994). Similar to (subordinated) debt holders, depositors can require a higher interest
rate from riskier banks, thereby compensating them for the risk of losing their deposits in
the event the bank fails. Moreover, since deposits are liquid, depositors can also withdraw
them if they feel the bank is taking excessive risks.
To measure market discipline the following equation is usually estimated:
∆ lnDi,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,t−1 + βi + βt + i,t (1)
where ∆ lnDi,t is the growth rate of deposits of bank i in year t, Riski,t−1 is a vector
of lagged indicators of bank risk, Controlsi,t−1 is a vector of control variables, and βi
and βt are bank and time fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Market
discipline is present if depositors move their deposits to safer banks. Therefore, safer
banks are expected to have a higher growth rate in deposits compared to riskier banks.
In Equation (1), a negative β1 coefficient signals the presence of market discipline, as safer
banks see higher deposit growth compared to more risky peers. Risk and control variables
are lagged to avoid possible endogeneity, as, for instance, bank risk can be endogenous
to depositor behavior. In the absence of a counterfactual, the wake-up call is identified
as the difference in behavior before or after crises, attributing all changes in behavior to
the crisis.
In this paper, I propose to identify the wake-up call in a different manner. To measure
the wake-up call, a perfect counterfactual would entail the same bank being exposed to
a scenario with a crisis and one without. The difference in depositor behavior between
scenarios would then directly identify the effect of a crisis, controlling for unobserved
characteristics which impact both the control and the treated group. In the setting of
depositor discipline, one would thus prefer to have the same bank in two different markets,
but with different realizations of depositor behavior due to certain events. Previous
literature suggests that the events leading to a wake-up call could be bank failures,
as these can make depositors aware that their deposits are possibly at risk (see e.g.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013).
While depositors can react differently across markets to this multi-market bank, bank
risk itself is determined and evaluated at the bank-level. The FDIC, for instance, does
not close down single branches but intervenes only in the bank entity. Identification
of the wake-up call then relies on multi-market banks, which share the same bank risk
across markets but experience different levels of discipline in markets with failures. This
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is visualized in Figure 1, where a bank is active in 7 markets, 3 experienced bank failures.2
In light of the figure, the question is whether depositors were more aware of the risks of
the bank in the markets with failure.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
Since bank risk is determined at the level of the bank, the differences in depositor
reaction between markets can only be due to the failures, using the markets without
failures as a control group. Empirically, this effect is obtained by performing the following
regression:
∆ lnDi,m,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,m,t−1 + β3Fm,t−k
+ β4Fm,t−kRiski,t−1 + β5Fm,t−kControlsi,m,t−1 + βi + βm + βt + i,m,t (2)
where ∆ lnDi,m,t is the growth rate of deposits of bank i in market m at time t, Riski,t−1
is still a vector of lagged indicators of bank risk measured at the level of the bank,
Controlsi,m,t−1 is a vector of control variables that can differ between banks or markets,
and βi, βm and βt are bank, market and time fixed effects to control for unobserved
heterogeneity. Moreover, Fm,t−k is a dummy variable indicating whether a bank failure
occurred in market m during the last k years and is interacted with the risk and control
variables. In this setting, a negative and significant β4 now measures whether the presence
of a failed bank leads to excess market discipline, with the combined discipline effect being
β1+β4Fm,t−k. Moreover, the length of the window k can be adjusted to measure short-run
(k = 1) or long-run (k > 1) effects. If bank failures do indeed lead to a wake-up call,
it follows that the change in behavior of depositors should be noticeable in markets that
experience them compared to those that do not. In Equation (2), this effect is picked up
by the β4 coefficient.
Control variables are included to control for market-specific characteristics, such as
the concentration and the number of branches present, or for bank-specific characteristics.
To control for the fact that depositors might move their deposits to a risky bank as long
as they are sufficiently rewarded with a higher interest rate, I include the bank-specific
(implicit) lagged deposit interest rate. Previous studies have indeed found evidence that
risk is priced priced into bank deposit rates (see e.g. Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Ellis and
Flannery, 1992; Brewer III and Mondschean, 1994; Cook and Spellman, 1994), or that
bank risk is priced into both the price and the quantity of deposits (see e.g. Park, 1995;
Park and Peristiani, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004; Ioannidou and de Dreu,
2006; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Bertay et al., 2013). Put differently, riskier banks need
to offer a higher interest rate to maintain or attract new deposit funding. In most cases
2For the purpose of this paper, a market is considered to experience a failure through the presence of
branches of banks that where closed down by the FDIC.
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however, the interest rate employed is an implicit interest rate, calculated as the total
interest expense of a bank divided by total loans. The downside of this approach is that
it does not separate between interest rates paid on insured or uninsured accounts, or
between rates on existing accounts compared to new ones. Moreover, and more impor-
tantly in the context of this paper, the implicit interest rate is bank-specific, making it
difficult to investigate the presence of price discipline in local markets. If the deposit
rate is determined at the bank level, price discipline in local markets would be incorrectly
identified. This depends on whether multi-market banks set their interest rates uniformly,
or whether they differ across markets, something on which there is no consensus as of yet.
While Craig and Dinger (2013) find that there is cross-market variation in deposit rates
of multi-market banks, this is not found by Radecki (1998), Heitfield (1999) and Park
and Pennacchi (2009).3 Since identification is potentially incorrect, I do not explicitly
estimate a price equation, but instead follow the estimation strategy employed by, e.g.,
Maechler and McDill (2006), and use the lagged implicit interest rate to take into account
that these rates can influence the quantity of deposits.
Equation (2) is estimated using OLS. The high-dimensionality due to the extra dimen-
sion m and the number of banks and markets involved means that many different types
of fixed effects can be included. Besides the standard bank, market and time fixed effects
for instance, it is possible to control for other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. For
instance, besides market fixed effects to control for market-specific changes in deposits,
and year fixed effects to control for countrywide business cycle effects, market×year fixed
effects pick up local market business cycle effects that could be misinterpreted as de-
positor discipline. Similarly, bank×market fixed effects can be employed to control for
market-specific strategies, as banks might want to expand their market share in certain
markets but not in others. To be able to include these types of fixed effects, I implement
a within estimator specifically designed for panel data models with high dimensionality.
This estimator is preferred over the LSDV estimator, since the LSDV estimator can be
computationally difficult to estimate due to the large number of dummy variables re-
quired. However, the unbalanced nature of the dataset has to be taken into account.
Mátyás and Balázsi (2012) show that applying an analytical within-transformation de-
veloped for a balanced panel leads to a bias in an unbalanced setting that does not drop
out as N →∞. Moreover, dynamic panel models also suffer from this bias when dealing
with an unbalanced setting. To estimate unbalanced panel models with high-dimensional
fixed effects, Guimarães and Portugal (2010) therefore propose a feasible iterative ap-
3Unfortunately, the deposit rate that banks choose to offer to depositors in a given regional market at
a given time is not publicly available. However, using proprietary data on interest rates at the bank-
branch level, Bennett et al. (2014) and Ben-David et al. (2014) suggest there is only weak evidence of
price discipline during the financial crisis. A possible solution to include price discipline in this paper is
to obtain the local price level from banks that are only active in that market. However, the identification
strategy employed in this paper depends on multi-market banks. A price level based on local banks
would undermine this strategy.
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proach based on demeaning the (in)dependent variables over one dimension at a time, in
order to minimize the regression RMSE. While Guimarães and Portugal (2010) imple-
ment this iterative procedure for 2 fixed effect dimensions, it can easily be extended to 3
(Torres et al., 2013) or even N fixed effects (Rios-Avila, 2013).
To obtain standard errors for the original model, Rios-Avila (2013) suggests to use
the algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002), which is necessary to correct for the
degrees of freedom.4 The standard errors are clustered using the banking market as
cluster. As OLS standard errors could be too small for proper inference testing in the
case of within-cluster serial correlation, Bertrand et al. (2004) and Colin Cameron and
Miller (2014) suggest using cluster-robust standard errors to account for possible serial
correlation. Following the suggestion of Colin Cameron and Miller (2014), standard errors
are clustered over the local markets as these are the fewest in number and lead to the
highest standard errors.5
Next, I will describe the data used in this paper, before proceeding with the presen-
tation of the results and robustness checks.
2.2 Data
The data used in this analysis are obtained from multiple sources. The main source
is the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD), a publicly available annual survey reporting
branch-level deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions, including insured U.S. branches
of foreign banks. The FDIC requires all institutions with a main office and one or more
branches to file this survey. While banks can choose how to assign deposits to their offices
(e.g. by proximity to the address of the account holder, the main activity, or origination
of the deposit account), it should be consistent with existing internal record-keeping
practices (FDIC, 2014). All branches and banks in the SOD have a unique identifier
and are geo-coded, meaning that the deposits of a bank can easily be allocated to each
banking market where a branch office is located. Consistent with previous literature, local
markets are defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and non-MSA counties (see
e.g. Prager and Hannan, 1998; Berger et al., 1999; Collender and Shaffer, 2003; Adams
et al., 2007), although robustness tests are performed by estimating Equation (2) on each
separate group and using the county as a local market. If multiple branches of the same
bank are present in a market, the deposits located at these branches are consolidated to
bank-market deposits. Since, as we will see later, the bulk of the bank failures occurred
from 2007 onwards, I obtain data for the years 2007 - 2013.
Data used to calculate bank risk indicators are obtained from the Call Reports for
Income and Condition, and linked to the SOD data using the bank’s unique FDIC assigned
4I thank Fernando Rios-Avila for sharing his code.
5Robustness tests with clustering at the level of the bank were also performed and lead to smaller standard
errors. Results are available upon request.
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certificate number. Unit banks, or other banks that have not filed the SOD survey, are
subsequently dropped. Data on bank failures are obtained from the FDIC’s Failed Bank
List, which lists failed banks for which the FDIC is appointed as receiver, the closing
date and, if available, the acquiring entity. To construct a variable indicating whether
a failed bank operated a branch-office in a certain market, I combine the Failed Bank
List with the SOD in the year prior to the failure, as banks do not file the SOD during
the failure-year itself. To remove spurious increases in bank-market deposits, I remove
bank-market observations when the bank has merged or acquired another bank that was
active within the same market. Data on mergers and acquisitions are obtained from the
Failed Bank List and the bank merger database maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago.6
Since the SOD is an annual survey, collected on June 30th, I use the second quarter
(June) Call Report to match bank-market deposits to bank fundamentals. Years are
subsequently defined as periods between the filing moments and failure years are appro-
priately updated. For instance, a bank that failed on June 19th, 2008 is linked to the
2007 SOD. However, a bank that failed on July 20th, 2008 is linked to the 2008 SOD in
order to determine where it was operating branches.
The SOD only reports total deposits and does not distinguish between insured and
uninsured deposits. Ex-ante, most discipline can be expected from uninsured deposits as
these better incentives to monitor the safety of their banks compared to insured depos-
itors. However, previous research has shown that insured depositors are also capable of
discipling banks, albeit to a lesser extent than uninsured depositors (see e.g. Park and
Peristiani, 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2013). Moreover,
government interventions have blurred the lines between insured and uninsured deposits.
First, the Dodd-Frank Act permanently increased the level of deposit insurance coverage
from $100,000 to $250,000, thereby effectively insuring previously uninsured deposits.7
Second, after the failure of IndyMac bank in 2008, the FDIC has assumed all deposits
for most bank failures, effectively insuring the uninsured depositors. Third, the govern-
ment has also bailed out the money market mutual funds, which are part of the shadow
banking system and did not fall under deposit insurance in the first place. Given these
interventions, it is safe to assume that uninsured depositors can behave as if they have
insurance, since they are practically assured they will be compensated in the case of a
failure. As all depositors were technically insured, the analyses provides a lower bound of
the level of market discipline present in the local markets. Although this implicit deposit
insurance could lead to less market discipline, studies on the recent financial crisis have
6Available at http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/publications/financial_institution_
reports/merger_data.cfm.
7While the Act was only signed into federal law in July, 2010, Congress had approved a temporary increase
in the deposit insurance limit starting on October 3, 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act retroactively increased
the limit to also cover failures between January 1, 2008 and October 3, 2008.
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shown that market discipline was not eliminated because of these bailout guarantees (see
e.g. Gropp et al., 2011).
The final dataset consists of 6,735 banks that are active in 2,328 distinct markets
(388 MSAs and 1,940 non-MSA counties) during a maximum of 7 years. The average
number of markets served by banks in the sample is 3, although banks such as Bank of
America, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank have branches in more than 400 markets. Moreover,
on average there are 6 banks present in a banking market, although some large MSAs
like Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, or Dallas-Fort Worth-
Arlington are served by more than 100 banks.
Summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables are reported in Ta-
ble 1. While most of the variables of interest are ratio’s, variables that are in levels are
deflated to 2007Q2 dollars. The dependent variable, ∆ lnDimt, is the percentage change
in deposits of bank i in market m in year t. The average bank-market experienced an
increase in deposits of 1.73% per year during the sample period. Despite the disaggre-
gation of the data across markets, the deposit growth mimics the values in Berger and
Turk-Ariss (2014), who use bank-level data. The most a single bank-market loses in
deposits from year-to-year is 29%, while the most deposits attracted represented a 58%
gain. The main explanatory variables for bank risk are Equity (Equity/Total Assets),
NPL (Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans), and ROA (Net Profit/Total Assets). These
variables cover different dimensions of risk, as the capital buffer indicates the absorp-
tive capacity of a bank to incur future losses, non-performing loans are a good indicator
how large those future losses can be, and ROA indicates how fast a bank can rebuild
the capital base when it retains earnings. F is a dummy variable indicating whether a
failed bank was operating a branch in the local market. In the analysis, this variable
is used to determine whether a failure has taken place in the market during the last k
years. Control variables include business model characteristics (Real Estate Loans/Total
Loans), efficiency estimates (Cost/Income), the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, se-
curities held for sale and investment to total assets, the implicit interest rate calculated
as the interest expense divided by total deposits, a dummy variable indicating whether
the bank is a savings banks or a member of a Bank Holding Company, and market
level characteristics such as the HHI (based on the level of deposits) and the number
of branches present in the market. To remove outliers, the variables ∆ lnDimt, Equity,
NPL, ROA, Real Estate/Total Loans, Cost/Income, Liquid Assets and Implicit Interest
Rate are truncated at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile. The summary statistics presented here
are based on bank-market observations, banks operating in more markets are thus given
a higher weight for those variables calculated at the level of the bank.
[Insert Table 1 near here]
Figure 2 shows the geographical distribution of failures occurring during the sample
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period. From this figure, we see that most failures occur in and around large metropolitan
areas, although they are divided between both metropolitan areas and rural counties.
Furthermore, Figure 3 plots the timing of the bank failures. It shows a clear peak in 2010
with over 150 banks failing, before steadily decreasing in the following years.
[Insert Figure 2 near here]
[Insert Figure 3 near here]
Table 2 shows summary statistics of failed and acquiring banks, and reports results
of a t-test comparing the average differences. In total, there are 426 failing banks and
403 acquiring banks that can be matched to the SOD and Call Reports. The number of
failing banks is higher than the number of acquiring banks because not all banks that
were received by the FDIC were later sold, and because some banks acquired multiple
failing banks. On average, acquiring banks were better capitalized, had a lower share
of non-performing loans, less loans overall, and were less reliant on deposits for their
funding. The failed banks were also significantly smaller, with their assets totaling $233
million versus $1.4 billion for the acquiring banks. Moreover, acquiring banks were more
likely to be a member of a Bank Holding Company, while the number of savings banks
that failed or acquired other banks was relatively low at around 2%. Finally, failed banks
operated branches across on average 7 local markets, while the acquiring ones were active
in 183 markets. These numbers, however, are skewed because of a few large failures and
subsequent acquisition. Median values - 4 and 18 markets for failed and acquiring banks,
respectively - also confirm that acquiring banks were active in more markets.
[Insert Table 2 near here]
Finally, Table 3 shows the characteristics of local markets with and without a failure.
In general, when considering both MSAs and non-MSA counties, we can see that markets
with failures were characterized by a lower level of concentration and more branches,
deposits and banks. The year after failure, banks active in non-failed markets experienced
higher deposit growth. The same conclusions hold when considering only the largest
markets (MSAs), albeit to a lesser extent. In general, as indicated by Figure 2, bank
failures occur in larger markets. To ensure that the results are not driven by this, I
perform robustness tests in Section 4 using only the larger markets.
[Insert Table 3 near here]
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3 Results
This section present the results of the analysis. First, I test for the existence of overall
market discipline in local markets during the crisis by analyzing whether banks with
better risk profiles see a higher growth in their deposits. In a second step, I test whether
local market with a bank failure experience extra discipline from depositors. Finally,
I explore some outcomes of the underlying mechanism to provide additional evidence,
before concluding with several robustness tests.
3.1 Baseline specification
The results from the analysis of Equation (2) are presented in Table 4. I report the
coefficients for the main risk characteristics, and refer the reader to Table A.1 for the
full results. In all columns, the dependent variable is the change in deposits of bank i in
market m in year t, while the variables of interest are the lagged capital ratio (Equity),
the share of Non-Performing Loans (NPL) in the total loan portfolio, and the Return-on-
Assets (ROA). All specifications include bank, market and year fixed effects.
[Insert Table 4 near here]
In column (1), we can see that market discipline was present in local markets through-
out the sample, as the coefficients on the risk characteristics are statistically significant
and have the correct sign. Branches belonging to banks that reported higher equity levels,
a lower share of non-performing loans, and a higher return-on-assets in the previous year
see a higher growth of deposits compared to other banks active within the market. When
comparing banks at the 75th and 25th percentile across the three risk variables, I find
that the economic effect of an improvement in the capital buffer is most important. A
bank at the 75th percentile of the equity ratio distribution experiences an extra deposit
growth of 2.5% compared to a bank at the 25th percentile. This value is -1.3% for the
non-performing loans and 0.9% for an improvement in profitability. These are relatively
large effects considering that the average deposit growth of banks in local markets is
1.7%.
In columns (2)-(4), the risk and control variables are interacted with Fm,t−k, a dummy
variable indicating whether a bank failure occurred in market m during the last k years.
Column (2) measures the excess discipline when a failure occurred in the preceding year,
column (3) does the same for 2 years since failure, and column (4) measures the excess
discipline if the time since failure is 3 or more years. Including the interactions does
not change the sign or significance of the main explanatory variables, but it does show
that excess discipline is exerted on banks in local market with failures. In the first
year after bank failure (column (2)), we can see that extra discipline is mainly directed
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at the capital ratio of banks and at the share of non-performing loans. In the years
afterwards, discipline is mainly directed at the capital ratio of banks, although the return-
on-assets also becomes statistically significant. Regarding the economic significance of
these coefficients, the capital ratio is again by far the most significant. In years 2 and
3+ after failure, the difference in deposit growth between a bank at the 75th and 25th
percentile of the capital ratio is 3%, while this is only 1.2% for the return-on-assets.
The results presented here suggest that depositor discipline was present in local mar-
kets during the crisis, and that experiencing bank failures leads to a wake-up call of
depositors. However, interpreting the results in this manner can be misleading. Between
2009 and 2011, the Deposit Insurance Fund essentially ran out of money as evidenced
by its negative reserve ratio (FDIC, 2012). To help the FDIC maintain its credibility,
Congress created an emergency borrowing line in March, 2009 of up to $100 billion, with
a possibility to increase this emergency line to $500 billion conditional on the approval
from the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury. Combined with the fact that most
failures occurred in 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 3), the result in Table 4 might actually be
due to an aggregate change in depositor behavior and not to bank failures. To explore this
possibility, I split up the sample for the years 2008 - 2010 and 2011 - 2013, and estimate
Equation (2) on these subsamples. The results are shown in Table 5. Specification (1)
estimates Equation (1) using the standard bank, market and year fixed effects, and shows
that general discipline is present during both crisis-periods. Moreover, the coefficients are
of the same magnitude, indicating no structural break in behavior as the crisis progresses.
The magnitude of the coefficients on NPL and the implicit interest rate do change, but
this can be attributed to the change in the average of the variables. Whereas the average
equity ratio and the average return-on-assets remained stable around 10% and 0.37%, the
NPL and the implicit interest rate changed from 1.1% to 1.9%, and from 0.5% to 1.4%
in the latter stages of the crisis, respectively. Finally, note that since bank fixed effects
are included, the identification on the BHC and Savings Bank variables relies on banks
becoming BHC members and savings banks becoming commercial banks, or vice versa.
[Insert Table 5 near here]
3.2 Do failures in all markets lead to extra discipline?
Having established that bank failures give an extra incentive to depositors to monitor
banks active in their local market, I explore several outcomes that can be the consequence
of this channel. The first is whether depositors receive different signals from different
bank failures. For instance, a failing bank with a high local presence is presumably a
stronger signal to depositors than a bank with little local presence. Since the former
failure is likely due to a downturn in the local business cycle, depositors might become
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more risk-averse after a local failure (analogous to Malmendier and Nagel, 2011). If
bank failures indeed lead to a wake-up call because of a downturn in macro-economic
conditions, local failures should give a stronger signal and incentive to depositors to
increase their monitoring. To investigate this possibility, I divide the failures into banks
with headquarters in-market and banks whose headquarters are located out-of-market.
The results are presented in Table 6, and show that for both in-market and out-of-market
failures depositors monitor the equity ratio in the short and long run. Interestingly, and
consistent with the experience hypothesis, depositors monitor the NPL of their banks
for 3+ years after in-market failures but not for out-of-market failures. Moreover, while
the return-on-assets is significant in later years after bank failures, this is only the case
for out-of-market failures. These results indicate that local bank failures indeed give a
stronger signal than non-local bank failures. Since local bank failures are presumably
caused by local business cycle effects, I interpret this as extra evidence for the failure-
induced wake-up call. Results for a similar exercise, where I look at failed banks with their
headquarters in the same state, or headquarters in another state than the local market,
are reported in Table A.2. The results are quantitatively similar and are therefore not
discussed here.
[Insert Table 6 near here]
Another question is whether depositors wake up to the same extent when they have
less choice to move their deposits within the same market. In markets with few banks, or
highly concentrated markets, where is the depositor going to run to? If depositors have
no choice between banks, they are less likely to move their deposits, in effect disciplining
banks less. A bank failure is thus expected to lead to a lower depositor reaction in concen-
trated markets compared to less concentrated markets. I split up the markets according
to their deposit-based HHI, following the U.S. Department of Justice guidelines to di-
vide banking markets into concentrated markets (HHI ≥ 2500), moderately concentrated
markets (1500 ≤ HHI < 2500) and markets with a low level of concentration (HHI <
1500). The results are shown in Table 7. General discipline is present in all markets, but
depositors react differently across markets when faced with a bank failure. In markets
with a high level of concentration, depositors focus mainly on the return-on-assets to
decide where to move their deposits to. In less concentrated markets, depositors tend to
value the equity ratio, which is arguably a better indicator of the risk of a bank than the
return-on-assets. Depositors seem to only exert discipline after failures when they have
a choice between banks. While it is appealing to interpret these results in this way, we
have seen in Table 3 that failures occurred less in concentrated markets. The percentage
of markets experiencing a failure is much higher for low concentration markets compared
to high concentration markets, meaning that this conclusion might be driven by other
market characteristics than the degree of concentration. To take this possibility into
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account, I perform the analysis on MSAs only in Section 4.
[Insert Table 7 near here]
3.3 Is this a general crisis effect?
The results presented here show consistently that failures in local markets lead to a
wake-up call of depositors, and that this wake-up call is a long-run phenomenon. However,
they still do not rule out that depositor behavior may have changed as a result of the
crisis. Berger and Turk-Ariss (2014) indeed find that overall market discipline decreased
during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis behavior of depositors. Since the sample used
in this paper coincides with the beginning of the crisis, it is possible that the results
presented so far are caused by a general change in depositor behavior due to the crisis.
To test this possibility of a wake-up call due to a crisis effect, I extend the dataset to
include the pre-crisis years 2002 - 2006. As there are hardly any failures occurring prior
to the crisis, a true differences-in-differences model is unfortunately not well-identified,
and I therefore estimate the following regression model:
∆ lnDi,m,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,m,t−1
+ β3C + β4CRiski,t−1 + β5CControlsi,m,t−1
+ β6CFm,t−k + β7CFm,t−kRiski,t−1 + β8CFm,t−kControlsi,m,t−1
+ βi + βm + βt + i,m,t (3)
where C is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the years 2007 through 2013 and 0
otherwise, and the rest of the covariates are the same as in Equation (2). The coefficients
of interest here are the crisis interaction with the vector of risk characteristics, β4 ×
C ×Riski,t−1, and the double interaction capturing the effect of risk when failures occur
during the crisis, β7×C×Fm,t−k×Riski,t−1. The results are presented in columns (1)-(4)
in Table 8.
[Insert Table 8 near here]
The table shows that there is a general wake-up effect during the crisis, as banks are
disciplined more in the crisis than in the years leading up to it. The positive coefficient on
the Crisis×NPL indicates that depositors heavily monitored on this variable prior to the
crisis. The total effect of NPL is still negative, which is consistent with market discipline.
Disciplining on the other risk variables occurs as well. From the double interaction with
the crisis variable and the bank failure indicator, we can see that excess discipline is
exerted in those markets experiencing failures. Contrary to the results of the baseline
specification, the effect of capital and NPL die out 2 years after bank failures. However,
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similar to the baseline specification, the disciplining effect of Return-on-Assets is present
3 or more years after failure. Overall, the results indicate that, similar to Table 4,
depositors exert extra discipline in banking markets where failures occurred. The next
section explores the robustness of the results presented so far.
4 Robustness tests
In this section, I present four robustness tests for the results in the previous section.
In the first test, I use the multidimensionality of the dataset to add extra controls for
possible unobserved heterogeneity. The second test investigates the choice of MSAs and
non-MSA counties as local markets, and explores some alternatives. The third and fourth
test address concerns regarding endogeneity, with the third test looking at failures in
neighboring markets as a way to control for local business cycle effects and the fourth
test excluding banks with a large local presence.
Unobserved heterogeneity The baseline specifications in Tables 4 and A.1 include
bank, market and year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. However,
given the dimensions of the dataset, it is possible to add more than the standard fixed
effects to control for the heterogeneity. For instance, while the market fixed effects can
control for market-specific changes in deposits, and the year fixed effects pick up the
countrywide business cycle effects, market×year fixed effects can control for local market
business cycle effects. Similarly, bank×market fixed effects can be employed to con-
trol for market-specific strategies, as banks might want to expand their market share in
certain markets but not in others. Given the large dimensionality involved in adding
bank×market and market×year fixed effects, these estimations are only feasible with the
iterative within transformation employed so far. In Table A.3, the baseline specification is
saturated with these extra fixed effects to control for observed and unobserved bank and
market heterogeneity: columns (1)-(4) show the result where the baseline specification
is augmented with bank×market fixed effects and in columns (5)-(8) both bank×market
and market×year fixed effects are added. In the latter specification, variables that vary
only over market and time (‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number of Branches)’) drop out due to perfect
collinearity with the added fixed effects. Moreover, the variable indicating whether a fail-
ure occurred in the previous year is also dropped for the same reason. This problem does
not occur with the dummy variables indicating if failures occurred in markets 2 or 3+
years ago. Overall, the results on the interaction with the risk characteristics are robust
to adding these additional fixed effects. Depositors discipline mainly on the capital ratio,
and this excess discipline is long-lasting as it is significant even 3+ years after the failure
occurred. Similar to the results in Table 4, the return-on-assets becomes statistically
significant in later years after failure.
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I also add the extra fixed effects to regressions in Tables 5 and 8. Overall, the results
are very similar. Specifications (2) and (3) in Table 5 show that adding the fixed ef-
fects does not change significance of the risk variables in the different stages of the crisis.
Moreover, columns (5)-(8) in Table 8 show that adding these fixed effects does not change
the result when considering a general crisis effect.
Definition of local market The second robustness test examines the definition of lo-
cal markets. Consistent with previous literature, local markets are defined as MSAs and
non-MSA counties. Given the research question at hand, this definition of a local bank-
ing market might not be the most appropriate. This paper tries to identify the effect on
depositors who have witnessed a bank failure in their local market, but there is hetero-
geneity in the size of these markets. For instance, the New York-Newark-Bridgeport MSA
consists of 25 counties. If a bank that is only operating branches in a few of these counties
fails, the entire MSA is considered to have experienced a failure. While depositors might
experience a wake-up call in these counties, it is questionable that this information could
impact depositors in other counties belonging to the same MSA. Nonetheless, in MSAs
news might spread faster due to a higher population density and, e.g., a higher share of
commuters. Non-MSA counties, on the other hand, may be closer communities where a
bank failure can have a stronger impact. Table 3 and Section 3.2 already provide some
preliminary evidence, showing that failures are more likely to occur in larger and less
concentrated markets such as MSAs.
In total, the dataset covers banks active in 388 MSAs and 1,940 non-MSA counties.
Despite including market fixed effects, the baseline specification only considers the average
impact of failures on discipline over both types, and does not allow separate slopes. To
test the robustness of this assumption, I first look at counties only, after which I analyze
the difference in reactions to failures in MSAs and non-MSA counties separately.
Table A.4 shows the results when defining the county as a local banking market.
Columns (1)-(4) display the baseline specification with bank, market and year fixed ef-
fects, while columns (5)-(12) add bank×market and market×year fixed effects. The
results indicate that general market discipline was present in the crisis, however it seems
that in none of the specifications significant excess discipline is being exerted by deposi-
tors. While the point estimates have the correct sign and similar magnitude as in Table 4,
they are not statistically significant and therefore the results from Section 3 do not seem
robust to the choice of local banking market.
This, of course, warrants a further investigation into the causes and the robustness of
the baseline specification. To do so, I revert to the original market definition of MSAs and
non-MSA counties. Instead of allowing for a shared slope across both type of markets,
like in Table 4, I now split up the markets and analyze the effect of failures separately
in Table 9. The table shows that overall market discipline was present in both MSAs
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and non-MSA counties. Moreover, the table confirms the previous result that in non-
MSA counties (columns (5)-(8)), there was no significant increase in discipline after bank
failures. In MSAs (columns (1)-(4)), however, there was extra discipline based on the
equity ratio of banks, and this effect is long-lasting. These results seem to suggest that
failures in non-MSA counties do not lead to a wake-up effect. A possible explanation is
that these markets are simply less populated and a lot smaller, and therefore depositors
are less exposed to failures. This explanation, however, assumes that MSAs and non-
MSA counties are subject to the same amount of bank failures. When looking at the
data on bank failures in Table 3, it becomes clear this assumption is not correct and
that the bulk of the failures occur in MSAs: of the local markets that have seen a failure
during the sample, 57% are MSAs, while they make up a much smaller share of the total
number of markets. For instance, from the markets that have not experienced a failure,
only 14% is a MSA and the remaining 86% are non-MSA counties. The wake-up call
thus seems more present in larger banking markets simply because failures have occurred
there more often. The results from Section 3 are thus still robust, but are driven mainly
by the larger markets that have experienced more failures.
[Insert Table 9 near here]
Neighboring markets Another concern is that failures do not occur randomly. While
Figure 2 show that there is variation across markets and states, Table 3 and the previous
section showed that larger markets suffered more failures. One way to control for this
potential endogeneity issue is to look at failures in neighboring markets. These failures
are likely due to the same local business cycle effects, but should not impact depositors
in the own market as they did not experience them. Moreover, neighboring markets
are expected to be similar in both observable and unobservable characteristics (see e.g.
Huang, 2008). If experiencing failures leads to extra discipline, I expect to find that
failures in neighboring markets would not lead to extra discipline, as depositors in the
own market should not be impacted. Table 10 shows the estimation output, where F
denotes the failure of a bank within the market the bank is active in, while Fn denotes
the failure in a neighboring market.
[Insert Table 10 near here]
Overall, we can see that the results from the baseline specification hold when adding
the neighboring failures. Depositors still react to Equity and NPL, and this is a long-
lasting effect. Failures in neighboring markets do not seem to consistently lead to extra
discipline in the own market, even though banks on average have a lower growth in de-
posits if banks in neighboring markets fail. In the specification with only bank, market
and year fixed effects, the effects on Equity and NPL of banks in the own market are only
significant 3 or more years after the neighboring failure. When adding extra controls in
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bank×market and market×year fixed effects, it becomes clear that neighboring failures
do not consistently lead to extra discipline. However, the effect of Equity after a failure
within the own market is always significant and of the correct sign. It therefore seems
that only experiencing failures in the own market leads to extra depositor discipline, and
this channel is robust for local business cycle effects.
Local bank endogeneity A second source of potential endogeneity is the relationship
between changes in deposits and a bank’s risk characteristics. Even though Equation (2)
tries to solve this by lagging the vector of bank risk characteristics, there could potentially
be a problem if a bank depends on most of its deposit funding from the same market.
If banks obtain deposit funding equally from multiple markets, there is no mechanical
link between the deposit growth of each bank in a certain market and the bank-level risk
characteristic. However, if banks rely mainly on funding from their one single market,
there is a potential link between the bank-market level change in deposits and bank level
risk characteristics. While this is partially dealt with in Equation (2) by lagging the risk
characteristics, the source of the potential endogeneity is removed in order to test the
robustness. I classify banks that have at least 75% of their deposits in the market as local
banks, and remove these from the sample before redoing the analysis. Table 11 shows the
results, which are similar to the baseline specification: extra discipline is mainly directed
at the capital ratio of banks and the share of non-performing loans the first year after
bank failure. In the years afterwards, discipline is again mainly directed at the capital
ratio of banks, although similar to the baseline specification the return-on-assets also
becomes statistically significant.
[Insert Table 11 near here]
5 Conclusion
This paper has looked at whether depositor discipline was present during the crisis,
and whether the bank failures have indeed increased discipline by serving as a ‘wake-up
call’. In doing so, this paper offers two contributions compared to the existing literature.
First, instead of measuring discipline at the level of the bank entity, this paper looks at
depositor discipline in local markets. The focus on the local market is motivated by the
fact that depositors generally only choose to keep their savings at banks that are active
in their vicinity. By comparing banks at a national or even supranational level, this
fact is not taken into account and therefore offers a distorted identification of depositor
discipline. Second, by analyzing the behavior of depositors in local markets, this paper
presents a cleaner identification of the wake-up call than previous studies have managed,
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as not all local markets have seen bank failures and therefore experienced the potential
for a wake-up call.
I find that discipline was present in local markets between 2007 and 2013, and that
depositors mainly focused on the capital buffers of banks. Furthermore, discipline was
more severe in those local markets that saw a failure, and the analyses show that this is
a long-run phenomenon. Depositors were also able to distinguish between different types
of failures. Whereas they reacted more heavily to failures of banks with main offices
within their local market, out-of-market and out-of-state failures did not give depositors
the incentive to increase monitoring on the remaining banks. Finally, since more failures
occurred in larger banking markets, the effect seems to be mainly driven by these markets.
The findings presented in this paper have important implications for the regulatory
and supervisory set-up following the crisis. Despite interventions such as bailouts and
increases in the level of deposit insurance, depositors still seem to monitor bank riskiness
and adjust their deposits holdings accordingly. Moreover, depositor discipline is more
present in markets in which the FDIC has let banks fail, even though the depositors were
often fully compensated. These failures, possibly serving as a reminder regarding banks
inherent riskiness, can actually lead to more involved depositors and potentially a safer
banking system. Finally, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NFSR) introduced in Basel III
will force banks to hold a sufficient amount of stable funding, which includes demand and
other customer deposits. This paper shows that deposit funding of banks depends not
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Figures and Tables













Figure 2: Location of bank failures 2007 - 2013
Failure
No Failure
This figure shows the location of all bank failures between 2007 and 2013 on a market-level.
Markets, defined as a MSA or non-MSA county, where failed banks operated branches are
highlighted. Source: FDIC Failed Bank List and Summary of Deposits.
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This figure shows the number of bank failures in the U.S. per year. Source: FDIC Failed Bank
List.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Dependent Variable
∆ lnDimt 123615 0.0173 0.1370 -0.2949 0.5845
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 133117 0.1072 0.0251 0.0631 0.1960
NPL 136667 0.0149 0.0139 0 0.0698
ROA 133238 0.0038 0.0038 -0.0137 0.0122
F 140170 0.1513 0.3583 0 1
Control Variables
Real Estate/Total Loans 132765 0.6917 0.1492 0.3131 0.9604
Cost/Income 133108 0.6892 0.1428 0.4355 1.2804
Liquid Assets (%) 133193 0.0802 0.0608 0.0148 0.3127
Securities for Sale and Investment 133172 0.1943 0.1060 0.0088 0.5185
Implicit Interest Rate 133156 0.0085 0.0057 0.0012 0.0228
Ln(Total Assets) 140170 14.079 3.0107 4.3474 21.201
Savings Banks 140170 0.0466 0.2108 0 1
BHC 140170 0.8799 0.3250 0 1
HHI 140170 0.2171 0.1398 0.0495 1
Ln(no. branches) 140170 0.8066 0.9322 0 6.9392
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The dependent variable
∆ lnDimt is the percentage change in deposits of bank i in market m in year t. The main explanatory
variables are Equity (Equity/Total Assets), NPL (Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans) and ROA (Net
Profit/Total Assets). F is a dummy variable indicating whether a local market has experienced a failing
bank. The control variables include business model characteristics (Real Estate Loans/Total Loans),
efficiency estimates (Cost/Income), the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, securities held for sale and
investment to total assets, the implicit interest rate calculated as the interest expense divided by total
deposits, a dummy variable indicating whether the bank is a savings banks or a member of a Bank
Holding Company, and market level characteristics such as the HHI (based on the level of deposits)
and the number of branches present in the market. For banks merging or acquiring other banks,
bank-market observations of the dependent variable are removed. Furthermore, the variables ∆ lnDimt,
Equity, NPL, ROA, Real Estate/Total Loans, Cost/Income, Liquid Assets and Implicit Interest Rate
are truncated at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile to exclude outliers. The data is deflated to 2007Q2 dollars.
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Table 2: Difference failed and acquiring banks
Failed Banks Acquiring Banks Difference Failed - Acquiring
Equity 0.039 0.121 −0.082***
Loans 0.719 0.669 0.050***
NPL 0.102 0.021 0.081***
Deposits 0.888 0.782 0.106***
Ln(Total Assets) 12.36 14.20 −1.840***
BHC 0.815 0.916 −0.101***
Savings 0.028 0.022 0.006
Number of Markets 7.525 183.8 −176.262***
N 426 403
This table shows differences in some key statistics between the failed banks and the banks that
acquired them. The variables are Equity (Equity/Total Assets), Loans (Loans/Total Assets) NPL
(Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans), Deposits (Deposits/Total Assets), Ln(Total Assets), variables
indicating whether the banks were part of a Bank Holding Company (BHC) or were a Savings bank
(Savings), and the average number of markets it had branches in. T-tests to compare the average were
performed and reported in the last column. The number of failed banks differs from the number of
acquiring banks because not all failed banks were acquired, and some banks acquired more than 1 failed
bank.
Table 3: Difference markets with and without a failure
Panel A: MSA and non-MSA counties
Market level Bank-level
Non-Failed Failed Difference Non-Failed Failed Difference
HHI 3484 2047 1437*** ∆ lnDi,m,t 0.020 0.002 0.018***
Ln(Number of Branches) 2.352 3.964 -1.612***
Ln(Total Deposits) 12.69 14.66 -1.973***
Ln(Number of Banks) 1.666 2.698 -1.033***
Panel B: MSA
Market level Bank-level
Non-Failed Failed Difference Non-Failed Failed Difference
HHI 1708 1526 182*** ∆ lnDi,m,t 0.033 0.006 0.028***
Ln(Number of Branches) 4.431 5.156 -0.725***
Ln(Total Deposits) 15.14 16.10 -0.954***
Ln(Number of Banks) 2.860 3.365 -0.505***
This table shows differences in some key statistics between markets with and without failed banks.
The market-level variables are the deposit-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the number of branches
operating in the market, the total deposits available in the market and the total number of banks
operating in the market. The bank-level variable is the dependent variable, the change in the level of
deposits of bank i in market m at time t. This bank-level variable is measured the year after failure,
while the market-level characteristics are measured during the year of failure. Panel A shows the
statistics for both MSA and non-MSA counties, while Panel B does this for only MSAs.
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Table 4: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Equity 0.853*** 0.801*** 0.790*** 0.784***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.725*** −0.657*** −0.670*** −0.683***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
ROA 2.435*** 2.277*** 2.091*** 1.920***
(0.264) (0.286) (0.293) (0.298)
F −0.086*** −0.066*** −0.076***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
F× Equity 0.266*** 0.206*** 0.196***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.058)
F× NPL −0.299** −0.166 −0.123
(0.120) (0.111) (0.108)
F× ROA 0.846 1.142** 1.433***
(0.550) (0.510) (0.488)
Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows the estimation results for Equation (2), regressing the percentage change in deposits
of bank i in local market m in year t on risk measures of bank i in year t − 1. Control variables are
as indicated in Table 1, every specification includes bank, market and time fixed effects to control for
demand effects. Column (2) measures the impact on market discipline 1 year after the failure has
occurred, column (3) measures the long-run effect 2 years after failure and column (4) measures the
long-run effect 3 or more years after bank failure. Full results are shown in Table A.1. Standard errors in
parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant
at 1 percent.
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Table 5: Is there a difference during the crisis?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.880*** 0.919*** 0.961*** 0.902*** 0.979*** 0.948***
(0.102) (0.126) (0.101) (0.126) (0.114) (0.140)
NPL −0.765*** −0.481*** −0.708*** −0.486*** −1.031*** −0.475***
(0.131) (0.106) (0.129) (0.103) (0.145) (0.117)
ROA 1.513*** 1.600*** 0.872* 1.688*** 2.231*** 1.603***
(0.475) (0.434) (0.477) (0.436) (0.532) (0.492)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 1.527*** 4.560*** 0.975* 5.226*** 0.205 3.862***
(0.537) (1.028) (0.531) (1.028) (0.623) (1.157)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.130*** −0.157*** −0.138*** −0.159*** −0.150*** −0.171***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
BHC −0.027* −0.012 −0.024* −0.026* −0.031** −0.022
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.013*** −0.006*** −0.028*** −0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010)
HHI 0.064 0.010 0.067 0.011
(0.040) (0.029) (0.043) (0.029)
Cost/Income −0.006 0.037** −0.015 0.035** −0.014 0.033*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
Real Estate Loans −0.104*** −0.048* −0.092*** −0.049* −0.056* −0.051*
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028)
Liquid Assets −0.591*** −0.361*** −0.580*** −0.361*** −0.533*** −0.351***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.037) (0.031)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.264*** −0.288*** −0.247*** −0.286*** −0.260*** −0.292***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
Savings Bank 0.215** −0.100*** 0.207** −0.101*** 0.262** −0.097***
(0.100) (0.005) (0.098) (0.005) (0.107) (0.005)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank×Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market×Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Within R¯2 0.038 0.032 0.050 0.048 0.056 0.047
N 40,186 43,945 40,186 43,945 40,186 43,945
Failed 0.138 0.168 0.138 0.168 0.138 0.168
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction during two phases of the crisis using a subsample
analysis. Specification (1) shows the results for the years 2008 - 2010 and the years 2011 - 2013. Spec-
ifications (2)-(3) repeat the analysis but add bank×market and market×year fixed effects, respectively.
Since ‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number of Branches)’ are market-level indicators and vary only over market and
time, they are dropped in specification (3). ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experienced
a failure during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at
10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 6: Is there a difference between in-market and out-of-market failures?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Type of failure In-Market Out-of-Market In-Market Out-of-Market In-Market Out-of-Market
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.800*** 0.805*** 0.797*** 0.792***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.655*** −0.680*** −0.650*** −0.683*** −0.652*** −0.686***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067)
ROA 2.378*** 2.330*** 2.290*** 2.166*** 2.189*** 2.056***
(0.269) (0.283) (0.271) (0.292) (0.273) (0.294)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.522*** 2.466*** 2.524*** 2.532*** 2.509*** 2.665***
(0.355) (0.356) (0.356) (0.359) (0.357) (0.364)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.055*** −0.054*** −0.056*** −0.055*** −0.057*** −0.057***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.019** −0.019** −0.019** −0.017* −0.018** −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.010*** −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.028* 0.025 0.032* 0.022 0.036** 0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Real Estate Loans −0.054*** −0.058*** −0.049*** −0.054*** −0.045*** −0.046***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.327*** −0.319*** −0.331*** −0.323*** −0.332*** −0.325***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.185*** −0.183*** −0.186*** −0.186*** −0.186*** −0.183***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.139** 0.141** 0.139** 0.138** 0.139** 0.138**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.115*** −0.092*** −0.094** −0.062** −0.102*** −0.061**
(0.039) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.036) (0.027)
F× Equity 0.272*** 0.290*** 0.296*** 0.210*** 0.255*** 0.210***
(0.083) (0.078) (0.076) (0.065) (0.074) (0.062)
F× NPL −0.521*** −0.274** −0.398*** −0.126 −0.348*** −0.118
(0.146) (0.137) (0.135) (0.120) (0.127) (0.116)
F× ROA 0.238 0.838 0.595 1.048** 1.023 1.104**
(0.760) (0.608) (0.703) (0.530) (0.663) (0.509)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.614 1.006 0.683 0.997* 0.710 0.534
(0.673) (0.650) (0.658) (0.585) (0.628) (0.570)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.010 −0.003 0.005 −0.004 0.005 −0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) −0.000 0.004** 0.003 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI 0.011 0.016 −0.010 0.028* −0.017 0.027*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.026 0.036** 0.020 0.012 0.027* 0.008
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.038** −0.017 −0.053*** −0.038*** −0.051*** −0.041***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
F× Liquid Assets 0.125*** 0.018 0.149*** 0.067** 0.153*** 0.083***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.037** 0.012 0.040** 0.031** 0.042** 0.020
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
F× Savings Bank −0.005 −0.009 −0.008 −0.003 −0.009 −0.008
(0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
Failed 0.090 0.107 0.090 0.107 0.090 0.107
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction to bank failures whose headquarters is located in the local market,
versus bank failures whose headquarters are located out-of-market. ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that
experienced a failure during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 11: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect when removing local banks?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Equity 0.448*** 0.428*** 0.425*** 0.424***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
NPL −0.616*** −0.572*** −0.596*** −0.614***
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080)
ROA 3.010*** 2.909*** 2.736*** 2.557***
(0.310) (0.329) (0.337) (0.342)
F −0.062* −0.047 −0.062**
(0.036) (0.032) (0.031)
F× Equity 0.163** 0.118* 0.109*
(0.072) (0.064) (0.062)
F× NPL −0.266* −0.046 −0.022
(0.157) (0.142) (0.134)
F× ROA 0.888 1.117* 1.403**
(0.708) (0.646) (0.616)
Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
N 63,440 63,440 63,440 63,440
Failed 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
This table explores the robustness of the results when removing banks that are considered local (i.e.
that have at least 75% of their deposits in the market). As the changes in deposits might lead to
a worse risk profile in the next period, these banks are removed for possible endogeneity concerns.
‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experienced a failure during the time period. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***
significant at 1 percent.
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Appendix A Additional Figures and Tables
Table A.1: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.853*** 0.801*** 0.790*** 0.784***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.725*** −0.657*** −0.670*** −0.683***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
ROA 2.435*** 2.277*** 2.091*** 1.920***
(0.264) (0.286) (0.293) (0.298)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.347*** 2.580*** 2.629*** 2.709***
(0.346) (0.360) (0.361) (0.362)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.053*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.058***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.020** −0.018** −0.017* −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.009*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.071***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Real Estate Loans −0.057*** −0.055*** −0.050*** −0.043***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.319*** −0.324*** −0.329*** −0.330***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.181*** −0.184*** −0.187*** −0.185***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.140** 0.140** 0.137** 0.139**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.086*** −0.066*** −0.076***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
F× Equity 0.266*** 0.206*** 0.196***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.058)
F× NPL −0.299** −0.166 −0.123
(0.120) (0.111) (0.108)
F× ROA 0.846 1.142** 1.433***
(0.550) (0.510) (0.488)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.895 1.068** 0.994**
(0.548) (0.520) (0.489)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC −0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.004** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
F× HHI 0.008 0.008 0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
F× Cost/Income 0.027* 0.009 0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.027** −0.040*** −0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
F× Liquid Assets 0.055* 0.088*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.015 0.027** 0.023*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
F× Savings Bank −0.008 −0.007 −0.014
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows the full estimation results for Equation (2), including control variables that were left out in Table 4 for
reason of brevity. Similar to Table 4, every specification includes bank, market and time fixed effects to control for demand
effects. Column 2 measures the impact on market discipline 1 year after the failure has occurred, column 3 measures the
long-run effect 2 years after failure and column 4 measures the long-run effect 3 or more years after bank failure. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1
percent.
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Table A.2: Is there a difference between in-state and out-of-state failures?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Type of failure In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.812*** 0.814*** 0.791*** 0.804*** 0.786*** 0.794***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
NPL −0.676*** −0.668*** −0.666*** −0.656*** −0.667*** −0.675***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
ROA 2.455*** 2.325*** 2.354*** 2.144*** 2.210*** 2.016***
(0.275) (0.279) (0.277) (0.289) (0.281) (0.292)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.466*** 2.526*** 2.525*** 2.559*** 2.566*** 2.658***
(0.354) (0.357) (0.357) (0.361) (0.360) (0.361)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.057***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.020** −0.019** −0.019** −0.017* −0.018** −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.010*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.028 0.026 0.029* 0.025 0.033* 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Real Estate Loans −0.058*** −0.056*** −0.053*** −0.052*** −0.047*** −0.045***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.327*** −0.319*** −0.332*** −0.322*** −0.333*** −0.322***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.185*** −0.185*** −0.186*** −0.185*** −0.185*** −0.184***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.139** 0.140** 0.136** 0.138** 0.137** 0.138**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.129*** −0.078*** −0.100*** −0.062** −0.106*** −0.070**
(0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
F× Equity 0.380*** 0.240*** 0.360*** 0.200*** 0.320*** 0.201***
(0.078) (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064)
F× NPL −0.368*** −0.316** −0.286** −0.230* −0.254** −0.137
(0.143) (0.130) (0.121) (0.126) (0.115) (0.124)
F× ROA −0.115 0.862 0.072 1.270** 0.530 1.466***
(0.660) (0.636) (0.626) (0.567) (0.587) (0.539)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.826 0.783 0.596 1.042* 0.509 0.831
(0.569) (0.614) (0.573) (0.601) (0.545) (0.571)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.008 0.001 0.007 −0.004 0.005 −0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.007*** 0.003** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI 0.004 0.018 0.001 0.025 −0.010 0.016
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.016 0.035** 0.002 0.019 0.011 0.018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.003 −0.037** −0.025* −0.048*** −0.028* −0.050***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
F× Liquid Assets 0.109*** 0.023 0.128*** 0.068** 0.133*** 0.081***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.030* 0.022 0.035** 0.031** 0.027* 0.028*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
F× Savings Bank −0.007 −0.008 −0.011 −0.002 −0.017** −0.010
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
Failed 0.094 0.110 0.094 0.110 0.094 0.110
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction to bank failures whose headquarters is located in the same state,
versus bank failures whose headquarters are located out-of-state. ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experi-
enced a failure during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; **
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table A.3: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt ∆ lnDimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.916*** 0.868*** 0.858*** 0.850*** 0.943*** 0.891*** 0.876*** 0.869***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
NPL −0.681*** −0.624*** −0.634*** −0.650*** −0.718*** −0.681*** −0.707*** −0.735***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.073) (0.077) (0.078) (0.081)
ROA 2.268*** 2.148*** 1.977*** 1.795*** 2.668*** 2.671*** 2.442*** 2.210***
(0.270) (0.294) (0.303) (0.309) (0.299) (0.327) (0.340) (0.348)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.211*** 2.155*** 2.194*** 2.334*** 1.939*** 1.979*** 2.124*** 2.295***
(0.346) (0.354) (0.357) (0.361) (0.392) (0.403) (0.409) (0.412)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.046*** −0.047*** −0.055*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.058***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.021** −0.022** −0.021** −0.020** −0.019** −0.019** −0.019** −0.018*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.039*** −0.038*** −0.038*** −0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HHI 0.032* 0.031* 0.032* 0.034*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Real Estate Loans −0.059*** −0.060*** −0.058*** −0.054*** −0.048*** −0.052*** −0.054*** −0.052***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Liquid Assets −0.319*** −0.317*** −0.326*** −0.338*** −0.316*** −0.317*** −0.330*** −0.345***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.180*** −0.183*** −0.187*** −0.187*** −0.190*** −0.197*** −0.207*** −0.207***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Savings Bank 0.115* 0.116* 0.114* 0.116* 0.153** 0.153** 0.151** 0.153**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.066** −0.063** −0.090*** −0.061 −0.101*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.053)
F× Equity 0.291*** 0.231*** 0.220*** 0.267*** 0.204*** 0.198***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071)
F× NPL −0.231* −0.105 −0.083 −0.112 −0.008 0.031
(0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.136) (0.141)
F× ROA 0.562 1.121** 1.488*** −0.067 0.682 1.135*
(0.557) (0.522) (0.519) (0.615) (0.590) (0.586)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.310 0.681 0.549 −2.390*** −2.972*** −3.785***
(0.508) (0.508) (0.491) (0.766) (0.765) (0.769)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001* 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.001 0.003* 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI −0.000 0.001 −0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
F× Real Estate Loans 0.013 −0.004 −0.008 0.031** 0.024 0.024
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
F× Liquid Assets 0.003 0.061** 0.109*** −0.004 0.056* 0.107***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.019 0.039** 0.036** 0.038** 0.064*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
F× Savings Bank −0.004 −0.004 −0.015 0.001 0.003 −0.006
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank×Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market×Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.039
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows robustness analyses for the estimation results of Equation (2). Compared to Table 4, this table exploits
the multi-dimensionality of the dataset by adding bank×market fixed effects in columns 1-8 and market×year fixed effects
in columns 5-8. The bank×market fixed effects control for different depositor reaction in each bank-market pairing, and
the market×year fixed effects control for a different depositor reaction per market over time. Since ‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number
of Branches)’ are market-level indicators and vary only over market and time, they are dropped in columns 5-8. For the
same reason, F drops out in column 5, as it is measures failures in a market during the previous year only, and is therefore
perfectly correlated with the market×year fixed effects. The results in Table 4 are robust to adding these control variables.
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